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UNITED STATES V. PHO: DEFINING THE LIMITS OF 
DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING 
John G. Wheatley° 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the consolidated case of United States v. Pho, 1 the government appealed two 
district court rulings that imposed criminal sentences outside of the range provided in 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines). 2 At separate trials, both 
defendants pied guilty to the crime of possession with intent to distribute five grams 
or more of cocaine base (commonly known as crack). 3 Rejecting the Guidelines' 
disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine, the district court imposed sentences 
that were below the Guidelines' range, but above the statutory mandatory minimum. 4 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated both sentences and remanded the 
case for reconsideration, holding that a federal judge does not have the authority to go 
outside the Guidelines' range based solely on a "categorical, policy-based rejection" 
of the disparate treatment of crack cocaine in relation to powder cocaine. 5 
The central issue in Pho was the status of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines after 
the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of United States v. Booker, 6 in which the 
Court held that the Guidelines are merely advisory. 7 Despite the Guidelines' lack of 
a mandatory provision, the First Circuit concluded that courts must still abide by policy 
choices reflected therein, although there may be individualized circumstances that 
warrant imposing a sentence outside of the Guidelines' range. 8 In so doing, the court 
curbed the newfound judicial discretion that Booker provided. Given the court's 
decision in Pho, the question arises whether the Guidelines once again impose a 
mandatory sentencing range, even in limited circumstances, and even though the 
Supreme Court excised the statutory provision that had made the Guidelines 
mandatory. In resolving this issue, to what extent should the courts look to the intent 
of Congress? More importantly, how should courts approach sentencing in the wake 
of United States v. Pho? 
This Note first examines the rationale behind the Supreme Court's decision to 
make the Guidelines advisory. It then addresses the historical background of the 
disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine and the objections to this choice of 
• J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Maine School of Law. 
I. 433 F.3d 53 (I st Cir. 2006). The two defendants in this case were tried separately, and their crimes 
did not involve each other. The cases were consolidated on appeal because the issue in both cases was the 
same. Id. at 54. 
2. Id. at 58-59. 
3. Id. at 57-58. The Sentencing Guidelines define "cocaine base" to mean "crack." U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D 1.1 ( c) cmt. n.(D) (2005). 
4. Pho, 433 F.3d at 57-59. 
5. Id. at 62, 64-65. 
6. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
7. Id. at 245. 
8. Pho, 433 F.3d at 62. 
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policy. After briefly observing how district courts have used the Booker decision to 
avoid the perceived harsh treatment of crack offenders, this Note analyzes the First 
Circuit's decision in Pho. This Note also addresses subsequent decisions regarding 
similar cases in other Federal Circuits and attempts to reconcile the conclusions 
reached therein. Determining that the appropriate inquiry requires a proper construal 
of federal statutes, this Note examines relevant canons of statutory interpretation. This 
Note then considers how the Supreme Court's ruling in Booker affects the appropriate 
statutory construction. Although the once mandatory Guidelines are now merely 
advisory in all cases, this Note concludes that judges must nevertheless restrict their 
sentencing discretion within the limited confines of the federal statutes when reaching 
their ultimate sentencing decisions. 
II. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: THE RETURN OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION? 
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Sentencing Act), federal judges were 
granted great latitude over setting the sentences for criminals. 9 Congressional concern 
over the disparity between the sentences imposed by different judges for similar 
conduct led to various bill proposals advocating an overhaul of the sentencing 
process. 10 After nearly a decade of consideration in Congress, discussions culminated 
in the passage of the Sentencing Act, which mandated that all federal judges impose 
a sentence within the limited range provided under the Guidelines. 11 
In Booker, the Supreme Court analyzed Sixth Amendment concerns stemming 
from the mandatory sentences. 12 At trial, defendants Booker and Fanfan were found 
guilty of possessing 92.5 grams of crack and 500 grams of cocaine, respectively. 13 At 
post-trial sentencing hearings, however, the probation officers' presentencing reports 
concluded that Booker had possessed 658.5 grams of crack, and that Fanfan was 
responsible for 2.5 kilograms of cocaine and 261.6 grams of crack. 14 Under the 
Guidelines, these amounts dictated that each defendant receive a much stiffer penalty 
9. 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law§ 839 (2005). Penalties for various criminal acts were still set by 
statute, but sentencing judges were granted wide discretion over the term and type of sentence to be 
imposed. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,363 (1989). 
10. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 292-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
11. Id. at 294-95. This provision of the Sentencing Act was codified in pertinent part in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553 [hereinafter Sentencing Statute). 
12. Id. at 226 (majority opinion). The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, for the right to a 
jury trial in criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
13. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227-28. 
14. Id. In a probation officer's presentencing report, the officer is able to prove to the judge, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the quantity of the drug(s) the defendant was guilty of 
possessing/distributing. See U.S. SENTENCING UIDELINES MANUAL§ 6AI .3(a) cmt. (2005). The report 
can include, and the court may consider, evidence that would otherwise have been inadmissible at trial, 
such as hearsay, uncharged conduct, or other conduct of the defendant that was neither proven at trial nor 
admitted by the defendant; any relevant evidence may be included. Id. Thus, a defendant can be sentenced 
according to a much higher drug quantity than was presented at trial. This is particularly true in situations 
when large quantities of drugs are attributed to a criminal defendant by way of his involvement in a 
conspiracy to distribute. See Michael S. Walsh & Joseph K. Scott III, Sentencing Guidelines 
Unconstitutional, Make Guidelines "Advisory," 52 LA. B.J. 466, 466-67 (2005); see also United States 
v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (holding that sentencing courts are permitted to consider a defendant's 
conduct relating to charges of which the defendant was acquitted). 
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than he would have received based on the evidence heard at trial. 15 The Supreme 
Court ruled that a mandatory sentence based on evidentiary findings not made by a jury 
constituted a Sixth Amendment violation. 16 
The Court concluded that the Sentencing Statute's mandatory provision was 
inconsistent with the requirement of jury-found facts and thus needed to be severed and 
excised. 17 The Court subsequently set the standard of appellate review of sentencing 
decisions to be a review for unreasonableness. 18 
By striking the mandatory provision from the Sentencing Statute, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Guidelines are now "effectively advisory." 19 The Court con-
sidered and explicitly rejected the option of keeping the Guidelines mandatory, with 
a "Sixth Amendment requirement engrafted onto it. "20 This remedy would have 
required that the jury find any fact that would enhance sentencing, thereby preventing 
a judge from increasing a sentence based on facts that the jury did not find, or were not 
admitted by the defendant. 21 Noting that "Congress would not have enacted sentencing 
statutes that make it more difficult to adjust sentences upward than to adjust them 
downward," the Court chose to sever and excise that portion of the statute requiring 
judges to impose a sentence within the Guidelines' range.22 Although federal judges 
are still required to take the Guidelines into account, the Court ruled that they are no 
15. Booker, 543 U.S. at227-28. Booker's sentence under the Guidelines would have been 210 to262 
months if calculated without the additional facts presented at sentencing. Id. at 227. The additional facts, 
however, raised the applicable sentence to 30 years to life imprisonment. Id. In Fanfan's case, the post-trial 
facts raised the sentencing range from 5-6 years to 15-16 years behind bars. Id. at 228. 
16. Id. at 244; see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (holding that a state court 
judge violated the Sixth Amendment by imposing a sentence above the statutory range based on facts not 
submitted to the jury); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that"[ o ]ther than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"). The Booker decision 
extended the holdings in Apprendi and Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Booker, 543 U.S. 
at 243-44. 
17. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. TheCourtalsoseveredand excised 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which provided 
for de novo review on appeal of departures from the Guidelines. Id. 
18. Id. at 261. 
19. Id. at 245. 
20. Id. at 249-50. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas advocated this remedy. Id at 284 
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (agreeing with Justice Stevens's 
suggested remedy, but choosing to write separately for other reasons). Stevens also wrote the portion of 
the majority opinion that held that the Guidelines are subject to the jury trial requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. at 226-27 (majority opinion). The Booker opinion was the product of a great split 
between the justices, with Justice Ginsberg being the swing vote. The Stevens faction (Stevens, Scalia, 
Souter, and Thomas) with the support of Ginsberg found that the Guidelines' approach to sentencing was 
inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment requirement that facts be found by the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 243-44. The Breyer faction (Breyer, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy) disagreed with this 
contention and, with the support of Ginsberg, adopted a remedy that would continue to allow judges to use 
facts in the probation officer's presentence investigation report when making their sentencing decision. 
Id. at 326 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part) ("[N]othing in the Sixth Amendment ... forbids a sentencingjudge 
to determine ... the manner or way in which the offender carried out the crime of which he was convicted." 
(emphasis omitted)). This same split of Justices occurred in both Apprendi and Blakely, although Justice 
Ginsburg sided with the Stevens faction in both those decisions (in their entirety). See supra note 16. 
21. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246. 
22. Id. at 257,259. 
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longer bound to apply them.23 District courts were thus granted greater discretion in 
the imposition of criminal sentences, with their sentencing decisions reviewed in 
appellate courts for unreasonableness. 24 
III. THE REBUFFED 100:1 RATIOANDTHEPOST-BOOKERWORLD 
A. Historical Overview of the 100: 1 Ratio 
The Guidelines use a 100: 1 ratio for units of crack to units of powder cocaine 
when calculating prison terms.25 In other words, possession of one unit of crack is 
treated the same as possession of one hundred units of powder cocaine for purposes 
of determining the sentencing range. 
The l 00: 1 ratio first appeared in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, prompted in 
large part by the death of rising basketball star Len Bias, who purportedly died from 
a crack cocaine overdose in June 1986.26 That summer, the Act was passed amidst a 
"frenzied" political climate. 27 The legislation established two mandatory minimum 
sentences for certain drug crimes-five years and ten years.28 
Despite the nearly identical chemical makeup of crack and powder cocaine (the 
primary difference being the method of production and the means of consumption), 
Congress set drastically different threshold quantities for the two drugs. 29 For example, 
to reach the mandatory minimum sentence often years, a defendant need only be found 
guilty of possessing fifty grams of crack, while the threshold quantity of powder 
cocaine was set at five kilograms (5,000 grams). 3° Congress found that crack was more 
dangerous than powder cocaine. This conclusion was based on Congress's belief that 
crack was: l) more addictive; 2) more often associated with other serious crimes; 3) 
more likely to trigger harsh physiological effects; 4) more likely to be used by young 
people; and 5) more likely to lead to widespread use because it is relatively easy to 
23. Id. at 264. 
24. Id. 
25. See U.S. SENTENCING UIDELINES MANUAL§ 2DJ.J(c) (2005). 
26. See William Spade, Jr., Beyond the JOO: 1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1249, 1251 (1996). Spade notes that, ironically, Len Bias most likely died from 
the inhalation of powder cocaine, not crack. Id. at 1250-51. 
27. See id. at 1250 (quoting Eric E. Sterling, President of the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation). 
28. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified in pertinent part at21 
u.s.c. § 841 (2000)). 
29. See id. Crack is a processed or "cooked" form of cocaine, derived simply from powder cocaine, 
sodium bicarbonate (baking soda), and water. U.S. SENTENCINGCOMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 16 (May 2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_ congress/ 
02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf[hereinafter 2002 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT). One gram of powder cocaine 
converts to roughly 0.89 grams of crack. Id. Crack is typically smoked; powder cocaine is usually inhaled 
through the nose (snorted), although users sometimes smoke it as well. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL POLICY, PuLSE CHECK: TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE 29, 37 (April 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/drugfact/pulsechk/apr02/ impact_ of_ sept 11.pdf. 
30. 21 U.S.C. § 84I(b)(l)(A)(ii), (iii)(2000). For further comparison, the ten-year threshold for heroin 
is set at one kilogram (1,000 grams), and for marijuana at 1,000 kilograms (100,000 grams). Id. § 
841(b)(l)(A)(i), (vii). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 218 2007
218 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:l 
manufacture and distribute, and tends to be more potent and pure.31 Subsequent to the 
Act's passage, the same 100: l weight ratio was codified in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. 32 
Discontent with the unequal treatment of crack and powder cocaine is not a 
modem trend. Even the Sentencing Commission has expressed its concern. In 1995, 
the Commission released a report that indicated that the l 00: l ratio disproportionately 
impacts low-level street dealers. 33 The report also identified statistics that 
demonstrated that the harsh sentences primarily affect African-American defendants. 34 
That same year, the Commission recommended eliminating the differential treatment 
of the two drugs, but Congress rejected this proposal. 35 The concerns of the 
31. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIALREPORTTO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
POLICY 118 (February 1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/crack/exec.htm [hereinafter 1995 
SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT]. Noting that the drug was not well known at the time the 100:1 ratio was 
formulated by Congress, the U.S. Sentencing Commission suggested that some of the assumptions relied 
on by Congress when setting the penalty structure have proven unsound or at least overstated. 2002 
SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 29, at 91. Nevertheless, the Commission agreed that crack 
cocaine is more dangerous than powder cocaine; thus some disparity was justified. Id. at 92, I 07 
(recommending a ratio ofno more than 20:1). 
32. See U.S. SENTENCING UIDELINES MANUAL§ 2Dl.l(c) (2005). 
33. 1995 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 31, at xii-xiii; see also RYANS. KING ET AL., THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 7 (2005), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/incarceration-crime.pdf (noting that 66.5% of all crack offenders 
sentenced in the year 2000 were low-level dealers or "mules"). The 1995 Sentencing Commission Report 
provided an example of a federal court case where two defendants purchased 255 grams of powder cocaine 
from their supplier. 1995 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 31, at 159. After they had brought 
the cocaine home, they cooked it into crack. Id. Unhappy that they were only able to get 88 grams of crack 
out of the supply (ordinarily they would have been able to get 200 grams), they called their supplier and 
complained. Id. Being told that they could replace the crack with another batch of powder cocaine at no 
extra cost, the buyers returned to their supplier with the 88 grams of crack in hand, but were arrested prior 
to completing the transaction. Id. Both the two defendant buyers and the supplier were first time offenders. 
Id The supplier's sentencing range under the Guidelines for selling 255 grams of powder cocaine was 33-
41 months; the buyers who purchased the powder and cooked it into crack ended up with a sentencing 
range of 121-151 months. Id. To make a similar comparison in terms of value, the report noted that a crack 
dealer with five grams of crack (10-15 doses), worth an average retail price of$275-750 would be subject 
to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 159-60. A powder cocaine dealer would need to traffic 
500 grams of powder cocaine (2,500-5,000 doses) worth an average retail price of$32,500-$50,000 in order 
to be subject to the same five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id at 160. 
34. 1995 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 31, at xi-xii. The report found that in the year 
1993, 88.3% of all defendants convicted of crack offenses were African-American. Id. at xi. Crack has 
been found to be more prominently used among black individuals, while powder cocaine is more commonly 
used by whites. See OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 29, at 29, 36. For a 
discussion of American drug policy's "prisoner-generating machine" and its impact on African-American 
communities, see Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2004). 
35. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,074, 
25,076 (proposed May 10, 1995); Act of Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, § I, 109 Stat. 334, 334 
(rejecting the Sentencing Commission's proposal). 
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Commission were reiterated in 1997 (proposing a 5: 1 ratio) 36 and in 2002 (proposing 
a 20:1 ratio), 37 but its recommendations did not receive the support of Congress. 
In December 2001, some of the Commission's concerns were echoed by members 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 38 Senators Jeff Sessions (R-AL) and Orrin Hatch 
(R-UT) introduced a bill that would have reduced the sentencing disparity down to 
20: 1 by increasing the applicable quantity of crack and decreasing the applicable 
quantity of powder cocaine that would trigger the mandatory minimum sentences. 39 
The bill directed that the Sentencing Guidelines be adjusted accordingly. 40 This 
proposed bill was never able to make it out of the committee, however, and subsequent 
efforts to reform have failed.41 
Challenges to the 100: 1 ratio in the courtroom have been attempted both on Equal 
Protection grounds, due to the disproportionate impact the penalties have on African-
American defendants, and on Eighth Amendment grounds that the sentences constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment. 42 Both these efforts, however, have proven futile.43 
B. Post-Booker: The Return of Legal Challenges to the Treatment of Crack 
Cocaine Offenses 
With the Federal Sentencing Guidelines labeled advisory, district courts have 
taken advantage of their new freedom to go outside the once mandatory sentencing 
ranges. Their judicial discretion no longer shackled to the Guidelines, many federal 
judges have gone as far as rejecting the Guidelines' sentencing range outright. 
Particularly under attack, once again, is the harsh treatment of crack offenses in 
relation to offenses involving its sister drug, cocaine. 
Numerous courts have come to the conclusion that the sentencing range in the 
Guidelines for crack offenses is excessive. Courts have pronounced such treatment 
36. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 2 (April 1997), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/NEWCRACK.PDF. 
3 7. See 2002 SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 29, at viii. The Sentencing Commission also 
reaffirmed its conclusion that the harsh penalties for crack offenses fall primarily on low-level criminals 
and African-Americans. Id. at vi-viii. 
38. See Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2001, S. 1874, 107th Cong. (2002). 
39. See id. § IOI. 
40. Id. § I 02. 
41. See RY ANS. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SENTENCING WITH DISCRETION: 
CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER IO (2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
pdfs/crackcocaine-afterbooker.pdf. 
42. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1298, I 304-
05 (1995); see also Matthew F. Leitman, A Proposed Standard of Equal Protection Review for 
Classifications Within the Criminal Justice System that Have a Racially Disparate Impact: A Case Study 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Classification Between Crack and Powder Cocaine, 25 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 215 (1994). 
43. See, e.g., United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 74-75 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that there was no 
"racial animus or discriminatory intent" in setting such a policy); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 99-
100 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to the I 00: I ratio); United States 
v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that the ratio was not enacted "for the discriminatory 
purpose of punishing blacks more than whites for similarly culpable conduct"); United States v. Avant, 907 
F.2d 623, 627 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the legislature is granted broad authority to set the contours of 
criminal law and punishment). 
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"indisputably severe,'>44 "greater than necessary," 45 and "unreasonable.''4 6 As a result, 
many defendants have received a more lenient sentence than they would have under 
mandatory Guidelines. 
A number of courts have chosen to use a revised ratio to guide their sentencing 
decisions. 47 The question arises whether this decision to use an alternate ratio when 
calculating a sentence encroaches on legislative power, or if it is a permissible use of 
judicial discretion. 
IV. THE PHO DECISION: REIGNING IN JUDGES' DEPARTURE POWER 
Defendants Pho and Lewis each pied guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a). 48 Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, Pho's sentence was calculated to be in the range of87-108 months, and 
Lewis' sentence between 235-293 months. 49 The United States District Court for the 
District of Rhode Island determined, however, that because the Guidelines were no 
longer mandatory in light of Booker, the court's task was to "impose a sentence that 
is reasonable whether it's in the guideline range or not," so long as the sentence was 
within the statutory minimums and maximums prescribed by Congress. 50 Rejecting the 
I 00: l ratio as "excessive" and "not reasonable," the court recalculated the defendants' 
sentences using a 20: l ratio instead. 51 This approach resulted in a sentencing range of 
57-71 months for Pho and 188-235 months for Lewis. 52 The court ultimately settled 
on a sentence of 64 months for Pho and 188 months for Lewis.53 The government 
appealed both decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 54 
Although the government acknowledged that the Guidelines are no longer manda-
tory, and that federal judges have the authority to tailor sentences based on case-
specific circumstances and the criteria provided by federal statute, it maintained that 
courts were not free to substitute their own preferred ratios for those provided in the 
Guidelines. 55 The government emphasized that it was the goal of Congress in creating 
44. Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
45. United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04-CR-30 PS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1568, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 
3, 2005). 
46. United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2006). 
47. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, No. S3 03 CR 1501 (SAS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23184, at *24 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2005) (10:1 ratio); United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 307-08 (D.R.!. 2005) 
(20:1 ratio); United States v. Leroy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 887,896 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (20:1 ratio); United States 
v. Castillo, No. 03 Cr. 835 (RWS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9780, at *13-14(S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2005)(20:1 
ratio); United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 781-82 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (20:1 ratio). 
48. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 57, 58 (1st Cir. 2006). 
49. Id. at 57, 59. 
50. Id. at 58. The mandatory minimums imposed by statute were five years (60 months) for Pho and 
ten years (120 months) for Lewis. Id at 57-58; see also 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(A), (B) (2000). 
51. Pho, 433 F.3d at 58-59. 
52. Id. Lewis was also convicted ofa charge of possession ofa firearm by a felon in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(l). Id. at 58. This second conviction is irrelevant to the analysis of this Note and will not 
be discussed further. The 188-month sentence was the sentence imposed solely on account of the drug 
offense. Id at 59. 
53. Id at 58, 59. 
54. Id 
55. Brief for Appellants at 10, 15, 32, United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006) (Nos. 05-2455 
& 05-2461). 
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the Guidelines to have sentence unifonnity across the country and that this goal should 
be given substantial weight when setting punishments. 56 It argued that to achieve 
unifonnity, most sentences should continue to fall within the Guidelines' range. 57 The 
government considered sentences within the Guidelines to be "presumptively 
reasonable," whereas sentences outside the Guidelines require justification based on 
unique circumstances and statutory considerations. 58 
By imposing a non-Guidelines sentence based solely on the district court's 
rejection of the l 00: l ratio, the government claimed that the court committed an error 
oflaw. 59 As an error oflaw, the appropriate standard ofappellate review is de novo.60 
The government argued that the dangers of crack warranted the disparity between 
crack and powder cocaine sentences, and noted that it was the intent of Congress to 
impose severe penalties for criminal violations involving even small amounts of 
· crack. 61 Rejecting the Guidelines' sentence, the government argued, frustrates the will 
ofCongress. 62 The government maintained that it is within the exclusive authority of 
Congress to set policy and detennine the severity ofpunishments. 63 The government 
contended that because it is not proper for the court to question the policy choice of 
Congress when such a policy does not violate the Constitution, courts should adhere 
to the 100:1 ratio.64 
The government insisted that selecting a ratio that deviated from the Guidelines 
would result in unwarranted sentencing disparities. 65 Such an approach, it claimed, 
would frustrate one of the goals embodied by Congress in federal statute. 66 The 
government concluded that imposing a sentence based on the court's own policy view 
was error as a matter oflaw. 67 
The defendants, on the other hand, contended that according to Booker, the court 
should only review the reasonableness of the sentence imposed. 68 Noting that the First 
Circuit reviews sentences for reasonableness under the abuse of discretion standard, 
Defendant Lewis argued that the sentence was reasonable given that the district court 
properly considered the factors Congress provided in the Sentencing Statute, including 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 69 
The defendants argued that Booker instructs courts to follow 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a), 
which "directs the court to impose a sentence 'sufficient, but not greater than 
56. Id. at 12. 
57. Id. at 11. 
58. Id. at 14-15. 
59. Id. at 15. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 17, 25. 
62. Id. at 33. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 34-35. 
65. Id. at 37. 
66. See id. at 39; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2000) (noting the "need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct"). 
67. Brief for Appellants, supra note 55, at 49. 
68. Brief for Appellee Lewis at 6, United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2461); 
Brief for Appellee Pho at 4, Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (No. 05-2455). 
69. Brief for Appellee Lewis, supra note 68, at 7-8. 
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necessary,' to support the purposes of sentencing. "70 Acknowledging that Booker does 
require consideration of the Guidelines, as well as all the factors listed under the 
Sentencing Statute, the defendants contended that greater justification for a sentence 
outside the Guidelines' range is not required. 71 The defendants rejected the govem-
~ent's contention that a "non-Guidelines sentence is presumptively unreasonable." 72 
The defendants maintained that the district court properly considered all of the 
factors under the Sentencing Statute 73 and, after careful consideration, selected a 
sentence that was both appropriate and reasonable. 74 Noting that the Sentencing 
Commission itself believed the Guidelines overstate the seriousness of crack offenses, 
the defendants contended that following the Commission's recommendations in their 
report while staying above the mandatory minimum sentence does not frustrate the will 
of Congress. 75 Taking into account all of the relevant factors, including the Guidelines, 
the Commission Report, and the considerations identified in the Sentencing Statute, the 
defendants maintained that the sentence imposed by the district court was fair and 
reasonable. 76 
The First Circuit determined that the issue on appeal was not whether the sentence 
imposed was reasonable, but whether the procedure used by the district court was 
correct as a matter oflaw. 77 Given that the challenge was to a legal conclusion of the 
district court, the court exercised de novo review. 78 
Rejecting the defendants' claim that refusing to follow the 100: I ratio would not 
thwart the will of Congress, the First Circuit concluded that federal judges are bound 
to follow the policy judgments of Congress, including the appropriate penalties for 
federal crimes. 79 The court analyzed the legal history surrounding the crack to powder 
cocaine sentencing disparity and recognized that the Sentencing Commission had 
70. Id. at 9; Brief for Appellee Pho, supra note 68, at 11. 
71. Brief for Appellee Lewis, supra note 68, at I 0. 
72. Id. at 11. 
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l)-(7) (2000). 
74. Brief for Appellee Lewis, supra note 68, at 11-12; Brief for Appellee Pho, supra note 68, at 17-18. 
75. Brief for Appellee Lewis, supra note 68, at 12-14; Brief for Appellee Pho, supra note 68, at 13, 17. 
76. Brief for Appellee Lewis, supra note 68, at 15-16; Brief for Appellee Pho, supra note 68, at 17-18. 
Although both of the Appellees' briefs claim that the district court properly considered the factors 
delineated under the Sentencing Statute, neither of the briefs mention how the district court applied the facts 
of the defendants' cases to the sentencing factors. Pho's brief did, however, come to the conclusion that 
the judge based his sentencing decision on the 2002 Sentencing Commission Report, which recommended 
a 20: I ratio between crack and powder cocaine. Brief for Appellee Pho, supra note 68, at 18; see also 2002 
SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT, supra note 29, at 107. Although pertinent policy statements of the 
Sentencing Commission that have been distributed to federal courts are an appropriate sentencing 
consideration, the report cited was prepared for use by Congress, not the courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(5) (2000) (providing that courts shall consider policy statements made by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2000) (providing that the 
Sentencing Commission "shall promulgate and distribute to all courts of the United States ... general 
policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence 
implementation"). For an example of a policy statement that should be considered by a sentencing court 
when appropriate, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 4AI .3 (2005). 
77. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2006). 
78. Id. at 60-61. 
79. Id. at 62. 
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repeatedly advocated eliminating or substantially reducing the sentencing differential. 80 
The court emphasized, however, that Congress had at times either rejected the 
Commission's proposed guideline amendments or taken no action in support thereof. 81 
To be consistent with the separation of powers in the Constitution, the court 
indicated that it was the proper role of Congress, not the judiciary, to set the penalties 
for federal crimes. 82 Although the court recognized that the Supreme Court's decision 
in Booker allows sentencing courts to ''tailor individual sentences in light of the factors 
enumerated in [the Sentencing Statute]," the court ruled that it is impermissible for 
judges to reject a policy determination ofCongress. 83 The court acknowledged that 
Booker's holding did allow sentencing courts to take case-specific circumstances into 
consideration when imposing a sentence, but held that this discretion does not entitle 
judges to base their decisions on policy considerations. 84 Rejection of the I 00: I ratio, 
the court reasoned, "impermissibly usurps Congress's judgment about the proper 
sentencing policy for cocaine offenses. "85 Concluding that the district court based the 
defendants' reduced sentences entirely on the court's disagreement with the harsh 
treatment of crack offenses under the Guidelines, the First Circuit held that the district 
court erred as a matter of law and remanded the case for resentencing. 86 
V. SUBSEQUENT CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS 
A. A Different Result in the Eleventh Circuit? 
A mere eight days after the First Circuit decision in Pho, the Eleventh Circuit 
issued an opinion in a remarkably similar case. In United States v. Williams, 81 the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld a district court's decision to sentence a crack offender to 90 
months in prison, even though the sentencing range under the Guidelines would have 
resulted in 188 to 235 months behind bars. 88 Are the Circuits thus split in their 
interpretation of Booker and application of the Sentencing Statute? 
In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit determined that once a district court has 
calculated the sentence under the Guidelines, the court may then impose a sentence 
outside that range as long as the sentence is reasonable. 89 In the view of the Eleventh 
Circuit, the factors listed under the Sentencing Statute remain to guide the sentencing 
courts, but the courts are not required to state on the record either that they have 
considered or discussed each of those factors. 9° Finding that the final sentence was 
reasonable, the court affirmed the sentence. 91 
80. Id. at 54-57. 
81. Id. at 56-57. 
82. Id. at 6 I. 
83. Id. at 61-62. 
84. Id. at 62. 
85. Id. at 63. 
86. Id. at 64-65. 
87. 435 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2006). 
88. Id. at 1351. 
89. Id. at I 353. 
90. Id. at 1353-54. 
91. Id. at I 356. 
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Although the Williams and Pho decisions appear to be at odds with one another, 
the two can be reconciled. The court in Williams concluded that the district court did 
not base its decision solely on its disagreement with the Guidelines' treatment of crack 
offenses; rather it found that the district court considered the defendant's individual 
history and the nature of the offense. 92 In the words of the court: "This is not a case 
where the district court imposed a non-Guidelines sentence based solely on its 
disagreement with the Guidelines. In this case, the district court correctly calculated 
the Guidelines range and gave specific, valid reasons for sentencing lower than the 
advisory range. "93 
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit did not mention any case-specific circumstances 
that justified deviating from the Guidelines. Instead, the court focused on the district 
court's belief that "a sentence of 188 months was unreasonable for a crime involving 
the sale ofonly $350 of crack cocaine. "94 The court also recognized the district court's 
conclusion that imposing a longer sentence ''would not promote respect for the law. "95 
Although the legal conclusions in both Williams and Pho therefore appear to be 
consistent, the district court in both cases (at least in so far as the record reflects) 
seemed only to focus on its belief that the sentence calculated under the Guidelines was 
in itself too harsh. 
B. The Fourth Circuit Follows Pho 
The Fourth Circuit followed the lead of the First Circuit decision in Pho on very 
similar facts. 96 In United States v. Eura, the defendant was convicted of possession 
with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine. 97 The sentencingjudge 
imposed a sixty-month sentence for this crime (the mandatory minimum five-year 
sentence), even though the Guidelines suggested a range of seventy-eight to ninety-
seven months. 98 This decision was based largely on the Sentencing Commission's 
reports that recommended narrowing the 100:1 ratio. 99 
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court failed to properly consider the 
provisions of the Sentencing Statute, particularly ''the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentencing disparities." 100 The court concluded that "giving a sentencing court the 
authority to sentence a defendant based on its view of an appropriate ratio between 
crack cocaine and powder cocaine would inevitably result in an unwarranted disparity 
92. Id. at 1355. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. The defendant agreed to sell to an undercover agent half a "cookie" of crack cocaine for $350. 
Id. at 1351. The cookie weighed five grams. Id. At the street level, crack is typically sold in units of one 
gram or less. See OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 29, at 26-27. 
95. Williams, 435 F.3d at 1355. 
96. See United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006). Since Eura was decided, several other 
Circuits have also followed the First Circuit in holding that sentencing judges are not free to reject the 
Guidelines' sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenses. See United States v. Miller, 
450 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 353 (2d Cir. 2006). 
97. Eura, 440 F.3d at 628. 
98. Id. at 628, 630. 
99. Id. at 630-31. 
100. Id. at 633 (quoting the sentencing factor located at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(aX6) (2000)). 
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between similarly situated defendants in direct contradiction to the [Sentencing 
Statute]. " 101 Noting that there can certainly be instances where crack cocaine offenders 
could be sentenced outside the Guidelines range, the court emphasized that the 
decision to do so must be based on "individual aspects of the defendant's case" that 
impact the factors to be considered under the Sentencing Statute. 102 Concluding that 
the sentencingjudge relied not on the sentencing factors, but upon the unfairness of the 
l 00: 1 ratio, the court remanded the case for resentencing. 103 
C. Of Utmost Concern: The Process 
The Pho and Eura cases differ from Williams primarily in the process used by the 
sentencing court. None of the courts in these cases found that the length of the 
sentence ultimately imposed was unreasonable. 104 The criticism, rather, was in the 
means of reaching the sentence. 
The First Circuit in Pho and the Fourth Circuit in Eura each found that the 
sentencing court did not base its sentence on the "real conduct" 105 of the defendant or 
the factors enumerated in the Sentencing Statute, but instead relied on their disagree-
ment with Congress's choice to treat crack offenders much more harshly than powder 
cocaine offenders. 106 The Eleventh Circuit in Williams, on the other hand, found that 
the decision to deviate from the Guidelines was based on the individual circumstances 
of the case. 107 At no point was the l 00: l ratio or the treatment of violations of different 
crimes even discussed. 
VI. INTERPRETING THE SENTENCING STATUTE 
As the Supreme Court has noted, defining the elements of crimes and setting 
penalties are legislative, rather than judicial, functions. 108 With respect to crack 
cocaine offenses, Congress has codified mandatory minimum and maximum sentences 
under federal statute. 109 This sentencing range, however, was narrowed even further 
when Congress mandated that sentences correspond with those under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. With the mandatory provision of the statute excised, it is 
difficult to ascertain how the Guidelines are to be applied in a post-Booker world. 
IOI. Id. 
I 02. Id. at 634 (emphasis omitted). 
103. Id. 
104. But cf United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434-37 (4th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the 
district court was justified in sentencing below the Guidelines range, but holding that a sentence of only 
ten years was unreasonable given that the Guidelines called for a sentence between thirty years and life 
imprisonment). 
I 05. The Supreme Court noted that the goal of uniformity in sentencing is not simply to have the same 
sentence for violations of the same statute, but to have "similar relationships between sentences and [the] 
real conduct" of the defendants. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253-54 (2005). 
106. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62-63 (1st. Cir. 2006); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 
632-33 (4th Cir. 2006). 
107. 435 F.3d 1350, 1355 (I Ith Cir. 2006). 
108. See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 485-86 (1948). 
109. See 21 U.S.C. § 84!(b)(l)(A)(iii), (B)(iii) (2000). 
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A. A Plain Reading of 18 U.S. C. § 3553(a) 
The Supreme Court severed and excised the portion of the Sentencing Statute that 
required sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the Guidelines' range. 110 With 
that provision gone, the Court instructed that the "remainder of the Act 'function[] 
independently."' 111 With the absence of the mandatory provision, a plain reading of the 
remainder of the statute reveals that courts are now simply required to consider the 
Guidelines as but one of several factors to assist the court in reaching a sentencing 
decision. 112 The only mandate remaining is that the court "shall impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth [in the 
statute]." 113 
In particular,§ 3553(a)(2)(A) directs the court to consider the "seriousness of the 
offense." Given that the Guidelines is a separate factor to be considered, 114 it would 
be superfluous to interpret this provision as meaning the seriousness of the offense as 
reflected in the Guidelines. Thus, it appears acceptable for a court to conclude that 
because the sentence as calculated under the Guidelines does not reflect the seriousness 
of the offense, a more appropriate sentence would be one outside the Guidelines' 
range. Similarly, the various other factors to be considered by the court should also 
warrant a sentence outside the range provided by the Guidelines, such as "the nature 
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant." 115 
With the statute functioning independently, and without the mandate that 
sentencing courts abide by the ranges provided by the Guidelines, as instructed by the 
Supreme Court, judges have the discretion to impose sentences anywhere within the 
mandatory minimum and maximum. This was also the interpretation of Justice Scalia 
in his dissent in Booker: "[L]ogic compels the conclusion that the sentencing judge, 
after considering the recited factors (including the Guidelines), has full discretion ... 
to sentence anywhere within the statutory range. " 116 Because the Guidelines are no 
longer binding, ''the sentencing judge need only state that 'this court does not believe 
that the punishment set forth in the Guidelines is appropriate for this sort of 
offense. "' 117 
110. See discussion supra Part II. 
111. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (2005) (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678,684 (1987) 
(emphasis added). 
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2000);seea/soBooker, 543 U.S. at 304-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) 
("If the majority ... thought the Guidelines not only had to be 'considered' (as the amputated statute 
requires) but had generally to be followed[,] its opinion would surely say so."); Sandra D. Jordan, Have We 
Come Full Circle? Judicial Sentencing Discretion Revived in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 615, 
673 (2006) ("Courts that are resisting the change announced in Booker, by continuing to give great weight 
to the Guidelines, are missing the point."). The sentencing factors are discussed infra Part VI.C. 
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). For a list of the purposes to be served in sentencing, see infra Part 
VI.C. 
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2000). 
115. Id.§ 3553(a)(I). 
116. Booker, 543 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
117. Id. Justice Stevens came to a similar conclusion in his dissent, stating that "the sentencing range 
contained in the Guidelines ... is now nothing more than a suggestion that may or may not be persuasive 
to a judge when weighed against the numerous other considerations listed in [the Sentencing Statute]." Id. 
at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
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Under the remainder of the Sentencing Statute, therefore, it appears that the 
district court was completely justified in sentencing defendants Pho and Lewis outside 
the Guidelines' range. Because the district court concluded that the sentence as 
calculated under the Guidelines was unfair, it chose to impose a lower sentence, still 
within the statutory range, which it considered to be "a fair and reasonable 
sentence." 118 The plain language of the statute does not preclude such a result. 
B. Congressional Intent and Statutory Interpretation 
When the plain meaning of a statute expresses the intent of Congress, courts can 
follow the words of the statute alone. 119 The plain meaning is not, however, con-
clusive.120 In situations where the language of a statute is inconsistent with the intent 
of the drafters, the intent of the drafters controls.'2 1 The Supreme Court has placed 
great emphasis on the importance of following Congressional intent, proclaiming that 
"even the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear 
contrary evidence of legislative intent. " 122 
The intent of Congress, of course, was clearly to have the Guidelines binding on 
sentencing courts. 123 Does that mean that the Guidelines are mandatory after all? 
It would appear that the Guidelines remain mandatory unless a conflict with the 
Sixth Amendment arises (such as the situation in Booker). This option, however, was 
considered and expressly rejected by a majority of Justices in Booker. 124 The Court 
was quite clear in this respect, repeatedly indicating that a "mandatory system is no 
longer an open choice," 125 and that it could not "see how it is possible to leave the 
Guidelines as binding in other cases." 126 The Court then left it up to Congress to 
devise a statute that would be consistent with the Constitution. 127 
The Court reached this conclusion through its interpretation of Congressional 
intent. Since the Guidelines had the potential to violate the Sixth Amendment, the 
Court concluded that if Congress were to have realized this fact prior to enacting the 
statute, they would have left the Guidelines advisory in all cases. 128 Thus, according 
to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the intent of Congress, the Guidelines must 
always be consulted, but do not need to be followed when a sentencing decision is 
made. 
118. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2006). 
119. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,543 (1940). 
120. See id. at 543-44; United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235,242 (1989). 
121. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
122. Nat'I R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'! Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,458 (1974) (citing 
Neuberger v. Comm'r, 31 I U.S. 83, 88 (1940)). 
123. The excised provision dictated that "the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the 
range [set forth in the Guidelines]." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000); see also United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220, 292-99 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (setting forth the historical backdrop of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines). 
124. Booker, 543 U.S. at 249-50. 
125. Id. at 263,265. 
126. Id. at 266. 
127. Id. at 265. 
128. Id. at 258. 
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Even where the Guidelines are advisory, Congressional intent plays a vital role in 
the analysis. It is the proper function of the legislature, not the court, to establish 
criminal punishments. 129 The judiciary is not entitled to interpret criminal statutes so 
as to defeat the will of Congress. 130 
With respect to the punishment of crack offenders, Congress has expressed both 
its intention of imposing harsh sentences and its desire to have sentencing disparity 
exist between crack and powder cocaine punishments. Congress has made its support 
of the 100: I ratio apparent not only by utilizing the ratio in setting statutory minimum 
and maximum sentences, but also by rejecting any proposals for changing the treatment 
of the two offenses in the Guidelines. 131 Thus Congress has made its intention clear 
that a defendant who sells crack is more culpable than a defendant who sells powder 
cocaine. Even though the chemical composition of the two drugs is essentially the 
same, Congress has expressed its belief that crack poses a greater threat to society. 132 
The power to establish intentional sentencing disparities is within the province of the 
legislature. 133 
129. Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419,424 (1959); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 
321, 336 (1998) ("[J]udgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong ... to the 
legislature."); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) ("Whatever views may be entertained 
regarding severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, these are peculiarly 
questions of legislative policy.") (internal citation omitted). The extent to which Congress can set 
punishments is, of course, limited by the Constitutional protection against excessive bail, excessive fines, 
and, most importantly, cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. It is rare, however, 
for a court to determine that the length of a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; the focus 
is usually on the type of punishment rather than the duration. 21 A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 973 
(1998). 
130. Arroyo, 359 U.S. at 424; see also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law§ 337 (2005) (explaining the 
separation of powers with respect to defining crimes and ordaining punishments). 
131. See discussion supra Part III.A. Ordinarily, when the Sentencing Commission submits to Congress 
proposed amendments to the Guidelines, the amendments become operational as a matter oflaw on the date 
that the Commission specifies. 28 U.S.C. § 994(0), (p) (2000). The proposed amendment fails only when 
Congress specifically acts to alter or reject the amendment. See id. § 994(p ). Congress did so act when the 
Commission attempted to alter the I 00: l ratio. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
132. One district court made use of an analogy to support its conclusion that judges are not entitled to 
categorically reject the Guidelines' disparate treatment of what could arguably be considered "similar 
conduct." See United States v. Doe, 412 F. Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D.D.C. 2006). The court pointed out two 
separate criminal acts that have different penalties under both the Criminal Code and the 
Guidelines-possession of a concealed dangerous weapon on an aircraft ( carrying a statutory maximum 
penalty of"not more than l O years" and has a Guidelines sentencing range of four to twenty-seven months) 
and possession of a dangerous weapon in a federal establishment other than a federal court (carrying a 
statutory maximum penalty of "not more than l year" and has a Guidelines sentencing range of zero to 
eighteen months). Id. Although the two offenses could be considered "similar conduct," they are not 
"similar conduct" within the meaning of the Sentencing Act. Id. (referring to the sentencing factor of 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(aX6) (2000)). Noting that Congress made its intention of punishing the airplane offense 
greater than the federal establishment offense, the court concluded that it would be improper for a 
sentencing judge to reject this disparate treatment. Id. 
I 33. See United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 720 (5th Cir. 2006)("[A] sentencing disparity intended 
by Congress is not unwarranted."); United States v. Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913,916 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[I]t is 
... within the province of the policymaking branches of government to determine that certain disparities 
are warranted."). 
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Having advisory, rather than mandatory, Sentencing Guidelines does not strip 
from Congress the roles of setting policy choices and fixing criminal penalties and tum 
these duties into judicial functions. Therefore, when applying the Sentencing Statute, 
courts must still adhere to the will of the legislature, including the policy choices of 
Congress as expressed in the Guidelines. Although the sentencing range in the 
Guidelines is now advisory and other statutory concerns may very well demand a 
sentence that is outside the Guidelines, courts are not entitled to base their sentencing 
decision on their disagreement with Congress's choice of policy. 
C. An Example of How to Properly Apply the Sentencing Statute 
The Sentencing Statute requires the court to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary, to comply" with the following purposes: 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.]134 
In addition, the statute further directs sentencing courts to consider: ( l) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) 
the kinds of sentences available; (3) the applicable sentence under the Guidelines; (4) 
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (5) the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities; and ( 6) the need to provide restitution to victims. 135 
Upon proper consideration of the above factors, the sentence imposed will then be 
subject only to review for unreasonableness. 136 
The district court in United States v. Avilez 137 applied the statute to a case 
involving the distribution of crack. 138 After first calculating the sentencing range under 
the Guidelines, 139 the court examined the nature and circumstances of the offense and 
the history and characteristics of the defendant. 140 The court found that Avilez was 
merely an "errand boy" for the primary culprit, co-defendant LaJara. 141 Avilez's role 
in LaJara's crack business was to retrieve small bags of crack ($20 worth) from 
LaJara's bedroom and bring them to LaJara, who would then sell the crack to 
134. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2XA)-(D) (2000). 
135. Id. § 3553(a)(l), (3)-(7). 
136. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,261 (2005). 
137. No. 02-CR-999 (FB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14145 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2005). 
138. Avilez was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation 
of21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(b)(l), 846. Id. at *9. 
139. Id. at *9-10. Avilez was subject to a base offense level of30, which provides for a sentencing range 
of97-121 months imprisonment for someone with little or no criminal history (such as Avilez). Id. at *9; 
see also U.S. SENTENCING UIDELINES MANUAL § SA (2005) (sentencing table). Due to several 
Guidelines-based reductions (safety valve provision, being a minor participant, and accepting 
responsibility), the applicable Guidelines range ended up being 46-57 months. Avilez, No. 02-CR-999 
(FB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14145, at *9-10. 
140. Id. at *10-15. The court was thus applying the sentencing factor located at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l ). 
141. Id. at •11. 
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customers. 142 Avilez would also at times collect money from customers, but all the 
proceeds were given to LaJara. 143 The only compensation Avilez received was an 
occasional gift of $20 when he was in need of money. 144 The court characterized 
Avilez as an eighteen-year-old boy that was "just hanging out" at LaJara's apart-
ment.14s 
Furthermore, the evaluation of a neuropsychologist indicated that Avilez was 
"borderline mentally defective ... [with] profoundly impaired thought processes, 
defective problem-solving capacities, and faulty reasoning [that] rendered him unable 
to make effective decisions and appropriate judgments. " 146 The doctor also found that 
Avilez tended to "defer to others with little analysis of their intentions." 147 This 
testimony confirmed the court's own observation that the defendant had a "reduced 
mental capacity." 148 In the doctor's opinion, Avilez was in need of psychotherapy, not 
incarceration. 149 
The court next addressed the statutory purposes of sentencing. The court again 
noted Avilez's minimal involvement in the crime, and his reduced mental capacity. 150 
Moreover, in the one and a half year period between Avilez's arrest and sentencing, 
during which time he was out of jail on bond, he complied with the probation officer's 
reporting requirements. 151 In the court's opinion, imprisoning Avilez was not needed 
to "reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal activity, or to protect the public from further crimes 
of the defendant." 152 The court stressed that the sentence should be focused on the 
need to provide the defendant with educational training, medical assistance, and 
effective correctional treatment. 153 
Having identified the sentencing purpose the court found to be of the greatest 
concern under the facts of the case, the court next turned to the kinds of sentences 
available. 154 As recommended by the neuropsychologist that evaluated Avilez, the 
court believed that a one-year term of confinement at a halfway house ( community 
confinement center) would best rehabilitate Avilez. 155 The court believed that the 
center was quite successful at providing mental health treatment and assistance in 
locating employment, while still imposing strict supervision. 156 Therefore, the court 
concluded that confinement at a halfway house would more adequately satisfy the 
142. Id. at *JO. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at *I I. 
146. Id. at *14. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at *I I. 
149. Id. at *15. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at *16. 
152. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C)). 
153. Id. at *16-17 (addressing the statutory purpose found at I 8 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(O)). 
154. Id. at • 16-17 (considering the sentencing factor located at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3)). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at *17-18. 
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sentencing purposes than forty-six to fifty-seven months of conventional incarceration 
as called for by the Guidelines. 157 
As this case illustrates, there may very well be circumstances that warrant 
imposing a non-Guidelines based sentence. Sentencing judges must, however, utilize 
the statutory framework in order to guide their decision. This entails both the 
calculation of the advisory Guidelines' sentencing range, and careful consideration of 
the statutory purposes and factors found in the Sentencing Statute. As shown by the 
Avilez case, some factors will be more relevant than others depending on the unique 
characteristics of the case at hand. Although it is not necessary to categorically recite 
each of the factors under the Sentencing Statute when imposing a sentence, courts must 
still use them as a guide to direct their decisions. 158 A sentence that is reached by 
proper application of those factors is subject only to review for reasonableness, 
whereas a rejection of Congress's policy choice constitutes an error as a matter oflaw. 
VIL CONCLUSION 
The problem with the decisions of the district courts in both Pho and Eura was not 
that they viewed the Guidelines as advisory, but that they did not use the statutory 
considerations as the basis for their sentencing decision. Both the First and Fourth 
Circuits have made this point clear. 159 
The decisions in Pho and Eura, however, must not be read as adding a mandatory 
element back into the Sentencing Statute. 160 Rather, they should be construed as a 
warning to the sentencing courts: although courts once again have the discretion to 
157. Id. 
158. The Circuit Courts are uniform in their determination that sentencing courts do not need to 
expressly consider each of the sentencing factors. See United States v. Rojo-Quintero, 175 F. App'x. 253, 
255 (I 0th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he sentencing court is not required to consider individually each factor listed in 
[the Sentencing Statute] before issuing a sentence."); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30-31 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (noting that a district court is not required to "categorically rehearse each of the [sentencing] 
factors on the record") (quoting United States v. Walker, 439 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2006)); United States 
v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 715 (5th Cir. 2006) ("The court need not make 'a checklist recitation of the 
[sentencing] factors."') (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006)); United States 
v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that the sentencing judge does not need to 
"categorically rehearse" the sentencing factors); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir. 
2005) ("Judges need not rehearse on the record all of the considerations that [the Sentencing Statute] lists; 
it is enough to calculate the range accurately and explain why (if the sentence lies outside it) this defendant 
deserves more or less."); United States v. Chandler, 419 F.3d 484,488 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Although 'there 
is no requirement that a district court ... engage in a ritualistic incantation or the ... factors it considers, 
the district court's sentence should nonetheless reflect the considerations listed in the [Sentencing Statute].") 
(quoting United States v. Washington, 147 F.3d 490, 491-92 (6th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Scott, 426 
F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[N)othing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on 
the record that it has explicitly considered each of the ... factors or to discuss each of the ... factors."). 
159. See also United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2005) ("A sentence explicitly 
based upon a non-existent statutory provision, even if 'reasonable' in length, constitutes error ... because 
of the unlawful method by which it was selected."). 
160. Cf United States v. Dowell, 430 F.3d 1100, 1112-13 (10th Cir. 2005)(findingthatthedistrict court 
committed error by treating the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, but that such error was harmless 
where it did not affect the sentence imposed). 
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sentence outside the Guidelines' range, they must still follow the procedure that 
Congress directs. 
Although in most cases a sentence within the Guidelines' range will be appro-
priate, this does not mean that the Guidelines should be presumed to be reasonable, for 
there are other statutory factors that must be considered as well. 161 Instead, the 
Guidelines provide a starting point from which the sentencing court can deviate in light 
of other statutory concerns. The unique facts and circumstances of each defendant's 
case will establish which factors are most appropriate for considering whether a 
different ( or "variant") sentence is warranted. 
The Sentencing Statute provides an all-inclusive list of considerations, however, 
and disagreement with a Congressional policy decision certainly is not one of them. 
The will of Congress must still be taken into account when making sentencing 
decisions. Even though in Booker the Supreme Court interpreted that the intent of 
161. The Circuit Courts are split on whether a sentence within the Guidelines' range should be 
presumptively reasonable. A majority of Circuit Courts-the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits-have ruled that a Guidelines-based sentence is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. 
See United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2006) (ruling that a sentence within the 
Guidelines is "entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness"); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 
551, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that "a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range is 
presumptively reasonable[,]" but is not "reasonable per se."); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 
553, 554 n.2 (6th Cir. 2006) (giving a sentence within the Guidelines' range a "rebuttable presumption of 
reasonableness," but noting that this does not mean a Guidelines-based sentence is "per-se reasonable"); 
United States v. Jordan, 435 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2006) ("A sentence within a properly calculated 
advisory guidelines range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness."); United States v. 
Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[A] sentence imposed within the guidelines range is 
presumptively reasonable."); United States v. Kristi, 437 F.3d I 050, I 054 (10th Cir. 2006)("[W]e join our 
sister circuits and hold that a sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a 
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness."). The First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, 
have refused to create such a presumption. See United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 ( I st Cir. 
2006) ("We do not find it helpful to talk about the guidelines as 'presumptively' controlling or a guidelines 
sentence as 'per se reasonable' .... Booker's remedial solution makes it possible for courts to impose non-
guideline sentences that override the guidelines, subject only to the ultimate requirement of 
reasonableness."); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[W]e do not hold that a 
Guidelines sentence, without more, is 'presumptively' reasonable."); United States v. Lisbon, 166 F. App 'x 
457,460 (11th Cir. 2006) ("A sentence within the guidelines range is not presumptively reasonable."). The 
Third Circuit appears to be leaning in favor of not making the Guidelines' range presumptively reasonable, 
although an earlier "unpublished" case conflicts with this conclusion. Compare United States v. Cooper, 
437 F.3d 324, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that a sentence within the Guidelines is more likely to be 
reasonable, but declining to accord Guidelines-based sentences a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness), 
with United States v. Gonzalez, 134 F. App'x 595, 598 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Although the Sentencing 
Guidelines are not mandatory, sentences within the prescribed range are presumptively reasonable."). The 
Ninth Circuit apparently could not make up its mind which way to go. An opinion issued by the Ninth 
Circuit that adopted the "presumptively reasonable" standard was later amended to delete this portion of 
the opinion. See United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez, 434 F.3d 1193, 1195 n.l (9th Cir. 2006) (original 
opinion); United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez, No. 05-30066, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2908, at *I (9th Cir. 
Feb. 7, 2006) (deleting "presumptively reasonable" language). Even though some Circuits have held that 
sentences within the Guidelines are presumptively reasonable, they have declined to hold that a non-
Guidelines sentence is presumptively unreasonable. As the Fourth Circuit noted, creating a rule that a 
sentence outside the Guidelines' range is presumptively unreasonable would "transform an 'effectively 
advisory' system ... into an effectively mandatory one," and therefore be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Booker. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 433 (internal citation omitted). 
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Congress was to have an advisory Guidelines system, the underlying policies of 
Congress-including the determination that crack offenses should be more severely 
punished than powder cocaine offenses-must still be respected. 
Imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines because of the decision that the "real 
conduct" of the defendant does not warrant a Guidelines-based sentence is quite 
different from imposing a sentence based on the belief that Congress's disparate 
treatment of two seemingly similar offenses is a poor choice of policy. Courts are free 
to sentence outside the Guidelines, but can only select a sentence (regardless of 
whether it is within the Guidelines or not) by using the factors delineated by the 
Sentencing Statute in reaching their decision, rather than relying on their disagreement 
with the disparate treatment of certain offenses. 162 
An old adage beckons that the ends must justify the means. This case 
demonstrates that the reverse can also be true, for here it is the means that must justify 
the ends. Since the problem with the district court's approach was with the means 
employed rather than the end result, there remains the question: What is to prevent a 
court from imposing whatever sentence it desires by using the reasoning of the policies 
and factors set forth under the Sentencing Statute? 163 The answer is, quite simply: 
Nothing. As long as statutory minimums and maximums are abided by, and the 
sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable, the court may impose whatever sentence it 
desires. The Guidelines, even in light of Pho and Eura, are still advisory. Whether 
they shall remain so, and whether the sentencing disparity between crack and cocaine 
offenses will continue, is left to Congress. 164 
162. See Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 517 (noting that sentences both within and outside the Guidelines' 
range are reviewed on appeal for unreasonableness). 
163. There is, of course, the concern that judges might use the rationale of permissible considerations 
as a pretext to support a non-Guidelines sentence when their real motivation is a disagreement with 
Congressional policy. The integrity and good faith of judges should largely preclude this result. Cf id. at 
528 (Lipez, J., concurring) ("The key is the faithful performance of the statutory duties set forth in section 
3553."). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Booker, there does not appear to be a significant rise in 
the number of sentences imposed outside of the Guidelines range. Statistics gathered by the Sentencing 
Commission show that post-Booker, 61.2% of sentences have been within the Guidelines, as compared to 
64.0%, 65.0%, 69.4%, and 72.2% for the years 2001-2004, respectively. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 
SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT 7 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker _ 
010506.pdf(note that the data for the year 2004 includes only those cases decided prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in United States v. Blakely); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE 
IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING I 31 (March 2006), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/booker_report/Booker_Report.pdf (concluding that "courts infrequently are using 
Booker to impose non-government-sponsored, below-range sentences" on the basis of disagreement with 
the 100:1 ratio). Given that Congress has the authority to curtail judicial discretion by setting mandatory 
minimum and maximum sentences, or by amending the Sentencing Statute, sentencing judges should, for 
the most part, limit their exercise of discretion to appropriate cases. See Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability 
of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155, 167 (2005) (predicting that the mere threat that Congress 
could eliminate judicial sentencing discretion should cause judges to carefully consider the Guidelines). 
164. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,265 (2005) ("The ball now lies in Congress' court."). For 
a discussion of the Booker decision and the options available to Congress, see Amanda Farnsworth, 
Comment, United States v. Booker: How Should Congress Play the Ball? 83 DENY. U. L. REV. 579 (2005); 
see also Reitz, supra note 163 (providing an excellent analysis of the extent of judicial discretion in both 
federal courts and selected states and identifying various actions that Congress could take to alter the 
current system). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 234 2007
